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BY PREPONDERANCE

OF EVIDENCE

UPON

DEFENDANT-State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755
(1977).
Doctor Joseph Toscano prepared a false medical report subsequently used by others to defraud the Kemper Insurance Company. 1 Although he admitted his complicity in the fraud, 2 the doctor
contended that his participation resulted from threats directed at
himself and his wife. 3 Fearing for their bodily safety 4 and lacking
I State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 423-25, 378 A.2d 755, 756 (1977). Doctor Toscano, without having examined anyone, prepared a medical report and bill at the direction of William
Leonardo. Id. at 428, 378 A.2d at 758. Leonardo had developed a scheme to defraud several
insurance companies by staging accidents and collecting for medical expenses and lost wages.
Brief on Behalf of the State of New Jersey at 3, State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief on Behalf of the State]. Over a period of three years, Leonardo
engineered twelve such accidents in various public places. 74 N.J. at 424, 425 n.2, 378 A.2d at
756, 757 n.2. A consistent modus operandi was employed for each episode by which one of
Leonardo's men would pretend to fall and then report to a doctor who was also part of the ruse.
id. at 425, 378 A.2d at 757. With the exception of the Kemper incident, Doctor Miele and/or
Doctor Rigeron furnished all medical reports. Brief and Appendix for Defendant-Appellant at 5,
State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief for DefendantAppellant]. In addition, "friendly employers" would provide verification of employment and lost
wages to augment the insurance claim. 74 N.J. at 425, 378 A.2d at 757. Leonardo, after taking
most of the money for himself, would divide the balance among "the 'victims,' " doctors and
employers working with him. Id. at 425-26, 378 A.2d at 757.
During January of 1970, two accidents were staged within two days of each other-one at a
discount store, the other in a movie theatre. Id. at 426, 378 A.2d at 757; see Brief on Behalf of
the State, supra at 7. Doctor Miele verified the victim's injuries for both falls. 74 N.J. at 426,
378 A.2d at 757. When conferring with the Kemper Insurance Company, the theatre's insurer,
the doctor confused the claims and informed the adjuster that he was treating the victim for
injuries resulting from a fall at a discount store. Id. Leonardo realized he needed another doctor
to allay the adjuster's suspicions and contacted Doctor Toscano. Id. at 426-27, 378 A.2d at 757;
see note 3 infra.
2 State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 423, 378 A.2d 755, 756 (1977).
3 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 10. Doctor Toscano attempted to raise a
duress defense at trial but the court granted the state's motion to exclude such testimony. State
v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 429, 378 A.2d 755, 758 (1977). The duress, allegedly experienced by
Toscano, consisted of a series of three telephone calls by Leonardo which became progressively
more threatening. Id. at 427-28, 378 A.2d at 758. Leonardo, demanding that the doctor prepare a false medical report, threatened-"[r]emember, you just moved into a place that has a
very dark entrance .... You and your wife are going to jump at shadows when you leave that
dark entrance." Id. at 428, 378 A.2d at 758.
At trial, the prosecution sought to prove that Toscano's cooperation with Leonardo was
intended to discharge his gambling debt with Leonardo's brother. Id. at 426, 378 A.2d at 757.
" State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 428, 378 A.2d 755, 758 (1977). Doctor Toscano, although
not personally acquainted with Leonardo, was awa-e of his past criminal record which indicated
a propensity towards violence. Id. at 427, 378 A.2d at 758. See also Brief for DefendantAppellant, supra note 1, at 22.
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confidence in the police, 5 Dr. Toscano yielded to the demands made
6
upon him .
At trial, the court determined that the circumstances described
by the defendant, Dr. Toscano, did not establish the defense of
duress. 7 Finding the doctor's subjective fears irrelevant," the judge
decided that the threatened harm was not sufficiently imminent to
justify a duress instruction. 9 The jury found Dr. Toscano guilty of
conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses, resulting in the court's
imposition of a $500 fine.' 0 The appellate division, affirming the
lower court's decision, held that the defendant failed to prove that he
acted because of " 'present, imminent and impending' " danger" 2
the traditional threshold condition of the duress defense.'
13
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v. Toscano,
granted certification to review the status of duress as an affirmative

5 Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 1, at 23 (citation omitted). At trial, Toscano
stated that he did not go to the police "because it seemed like every time this fellow (Leonardo)
was arrested, he was out in the streets again right away." Id. The doctor expressed his fear that
if he did not comply with Leonardo's demand that he "was going to be afraid . . . from then
on." Id. at 22.
6 State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 428, 378 A.2d 755, 758 (1977). Two days'after Leonardo's
final telephone call, Toscano delivered the completed medical report to one of Leonardo's accomplices. Id. The doctor received no compensation for his services. Id.
7 State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 430, 378 A.2d 755, 759 (1977). The court reiterated the
common law rule that the threatened harm must have been "present, imminent and impending" for the accused to present successfully a duress defense. Id. at 429, 378 A.2d at 759.
Furthermore, the threatened danger must consist of serious bodily injury or death. Id. For a
detailed discussion of the common law position with respect to the duress defense, see notes
32-49 infra and accompanying text.
I State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 429, 378 A.2d 755, 759 (1977). The court emphasized that
Toscano's failure to avail himself of the opportunity to seek police assistance was based entirely
on "his [own] doubts that police would be willing or able to protect him." Id.
9 State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 429-30, 378 A.2d 755, 759 (1977). The court noted that
Toscano's "subjective estimate of the immediacy of the harm" did not meet the common law
standard. Id. Rather, the court held that to establish successfully the defense, one must meet
"an objective standard [of immediacy] which included a reasonable explanation of why he did
not report the threats to the police." Id.
50 State v. Toscano, 74 N.J. 421, 423-24, 378 A.2d 755, 756 (1977).
11 State v. Toscano, 153 N.J. Super. 7, 10, 378 A.2d 777, 779 (App. Div. 1975), rev'd, 74
N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 (1977). The three judge panel emphasized Toscano's failure to obtain
police assistance during the interval between Leonardo's threat and the commission of the
crime. Id.
12 State v. Toscano, 153 N.J. Super. 7, 10, 378 A.2d 777. 779 (App. Div. 1975), rev'd, 74
N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 (1977). The court based its decision on State v. Churchill, 105 N.J.L.
123, 143 A. 330 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928), and State v. Palmieri, 93 N.J.L. 195, 107 A. 407 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1919). 153 N.J. Super. at 10, 378 A.2d at 779. For a more detailed analysis of
these decisions, see notes 76-84 infra and accompanying text.
'3 74 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755 (1977).
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defense to criminal prosecution. 14 Justice Pashman, writing for the
majority, 15 stated that duress constitutes a potential defense to any
crime except murder. 16 The court further held that the burden of
proof rests on the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 17 that he acted because of threats or actual use of unlawful
force against himself or another, "which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist."18 The supreme court reversed Doctor Toscano's conviction and mandated a
new trial. 19 While concurring with the court's adoption of a new
duress standard, 20 Judge Conford, in the only dissenting opinion, disagreed with the majority's allocation of the burden of persuasion as to
21
the duress defense.
14 Id. at 424, 378 A.2d at 756. Prior to Toscano, the New Jersey judiciary had never determined whether duress was available as a defense to prosecution. Id. at 430-32, 378 A.2d at
759-60; see notes 74-75 infra and accompanying text. The courts have disposed of criminal
cases without reaching this fundamental question. 74 N.J. at 430-31, 378 A.2d at 759-60. The
court considered Toscano to be "the first instance in which a defendant charged with a crime
other than murder allegedly committed under the threat of serious bodily injury to himself and
a near relative has raised the issue of whether such harm must be 'present, imminent and
impending.' " Id. at 432, 378 A.2d at 760.
15 74 N.J. at 423, 378 A.2d at 756.
16 Id. at 424, 442, 378 A.2d at 756, 765. This position accords with that taken by most
jurisdictions. See notes 36, 98-100 infra and accompanying text.
17 74 N.J. at 442, 378 A.2d at 765. A preponderance of the evidence refers to the quantum
of proof necessary to establish an issue. Professor McCormick defined it as "proof which leads
the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence."
C. McCorpmICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 338, at 794 (2d ed. 1972). The
Toscano court, by imposing the full burden of proof on the defendant, utilized an affirmative
defense procedure to offset its liberal formulation of duress. 74 N.J. at 443, 378 A.2d at 766.
Since the burden of persuasion significantly outweighs the burden of producing evidence "[i]n
terms of importance," Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in
Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 172 (1969), it should properly be
called aflirmative only when the defendant must carry both the initial burden of introducing
evidence and the burden of persuasion as to a defense. Id.
The term "affirmative defense" is reserved in this Note for the critical procedure of imposing on the criminal defendant the burden of persuasion. But see MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.12,
2.09(1) (1962); New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:1-12 to :2-9 (West
eft. Sept. 1, 1979) (both labelling duress an affirmative defense while only imposing burden of
introducing evidence of duress on accused).
18 74 N.J. at 442, 378 A.2d at 765. The court employed a standard identical to that in
section 2.09(1) of the Model Penal Code and the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West eff. Sept. 1, 1979). For a complete discussion of these code sections, see notes 108-18 infra and accompanying text.
19 74 N.J. at 444, 378 A.2d at 766.
20 Id. Judge Conford viewed the majority's "substantive reformulation of, the defense of
duress . . . [as] a progressive step in our jurisprudence" and joined in the reversal of Toscano's
conviction. Id. at 444-45, 378 A.2d at 766-67.
21 Id. at 444-46, 378 A.2d at 766-67. For a discussion of Judge Conford's dissent, see notes
147-58 infra and accompanying text.
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Historically, two divergent approaches have existed with regard
to the defense of duress. The traditional common law school of
thought labels duress an exculpatory condition. 2 2 Since harm of
greater magnitude has been avoided,2 3 the accused's conduct, though
violative of the criminal law, 2 4 will escape sanction. 2 5 Under this
view, "volitional intent" 26 is acknowledged, but the accused's
"reasonable fear of harm justifies his act." 2 7 The contemporary approach focuses on culpability alleviating responsibility for criminal
conduct where the accused lacked sufficient criminal intent. 2 8 Modern jurists and commentators, employing an expanded definition of
mens rea, 29 find the accused not guilty by reason of duress rather
30
than guilty but excused.
At common law, an act committed under duress 31 may constitute
an excuse to prosecution provided certain stringent requirements are
22 See, e.g.,

G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 181, at 592 (1953);

Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept of Criminal Responsibility,
18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 326-27 (1966); Perkins, The Doctrine of Coercion, 19 IOWA L. REV. 507,
518 (1934). But see 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 108 (1883)
(duress should never excuse crime, only mitigate punishment).
23 W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 49, at 374 (2d ed. 1972). This
"choice of evils" situation has been well described as a situation where one must "in order to
escape what he dislikes most . . . do something which he dislikes less, though he may dislike
extremely what he determines to do." 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at 102. The general "principle [is] that, where one of two harms is unavoidable, it is right to choose the lesser one." J.
HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 422 (2d ed. 1947).
24 The existence of a criminal violation has resulted in the formulation of rigid standards in
order to prove a duress defense. "It would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant could shield
himself from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from or because of a threat of a
third person." 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 384, at 516 (12th ed. 1932) (footnote omitted).

To avoid abuse of this defense which "held within it the germs of potential disorder . ..it had
to be well hedged and strict of proof." Newman & Weitzer, Duress, Free Will and the Criminal
Law, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 314 (1957). It appears, however, that such inflexibility and
caution virtually precluded availability of the defense. J. HALL, supra note 23, at 414-15.
25 See note 23 supra.
26 Note, Affirmative Defenses and Due Process: The Constitutionalityof Placing a Burden of
Persuasion on a Criminal Defendant, 64 GEO. L.J. 871, 886-87 (1976).
27 Id.
28 See, e.g., id. at 880; Newman & Weitzer, supra note 24, at 313.
29 Moore v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 736, 224 S.E.2d 856, 857 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other
grounds, 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976); People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 622, 232
N.W.2d 184, 187 (1975); see Note, supra note 26, at 880. This approach requires that "not only
must the defendant act voluntarily and with knowledge of the probable consequences of his
acts, but also his state of mind must be sufficiently criminal to justify punishment." Id.;
Newman & Weitzer, supra note 24, at 313 (arguing that in duress situation, " 'free will' is
stolen").
30 Note, supra note 26, at 880. This result flows from an analysis acknowledging the impossibility of "the ready separation of elements from defenses." Id. at 882.
31 The terms coercion and compulsion have historically been interchanged with the term
duress although not technically synonymous. See Perkins, supra note 22, at 507; Hersey &
Avins, Compulsion as a Defense to Criminal Prosecution, 11 OKLA. L. REV. 283, 283 (1958).
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met. 3 2 The duress must be " 'present, imminent and impending,
and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done."' 33 Although the
courts allow duress as a defense to a wide range of crimes, 34 they
routinely exclude the defense in homicide cases. 3 5 This exception to
the general availability of duress can be explained by the extreme and
36
irreparable nature of the crime of murder.
Often the court examines the issue of immediacy before considering the other elements of the duress defense. 3 7 Because the
threatened injury must be "present, imminent and impending,"
threats of future harm prove inadequate. 3 8 At the core of this im32 Perkins, supra note 22, at 518; see Browning v. State, 31 Ala. App. 137, 140, 13 So. 2d
54, 56 (1943); Nall v. Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 700, 702, 271 S.W. 1059, 1059-60 (1925); People
v. Merhige, 212 Mich. 601, 610-11, 180 N.W. 418, 422 (1920).
33 Perkins, supra note 22, at 518.
34 Defendants have raised the duress defense to crimes varying from felonies to misdemeanors. See, e.g., Kawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717, 735 (1952) (treason); Shannon v.
United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935) (kidnapping); People v. Sanders, 82 Cal. App.
778, 780, 256 P. 251, 254 (1927) (forgery); Burton v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 196, 197, 101 S.W.
226, 229 (Crim. App. 1907) (bigamy).
'5 The exclusion of duress as a defense to murder, while not universal, finds general acceptance as good law. Taylor v. State, 158 Miss. 505, 510, 130 So. 502, 504 (1930); State v.
Nargashian, 26 R.I. 299, 304, 58 A. 953, 955 (1904); Arp v. State, 97 Ala. 5, 12, 12 So. 301, 303
(1893). Contra, Model Penal Code § 2.09 (1962); id., Comments at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960)
(allowing duress as defense to murder). Some jurisdictions, under common law or statute, permit duress to mitigate the accused's punishment or the crime charged. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.46(1) (West 1958); New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9(b)
(West eff. Sept. 1, 1979) (mitigates murder to manslaughter). For text of the New Jersey provision, see note 108 infra. Duress can be used to show the absence of premeditation and intent to
kill, thereby mitigating the punishment.
36 The underlying rationale of denial of the duress defense to a murder charge is founded
on
the premise that one should risk or sacrifice one's own life rather than take the life of an
innocent person. State v. Dissicini, 126 N.J. Super. 565, 571, 316 A.2d 12, 16 (App. Div. 1974),
aff'd, 66 N.J. 411, 331 A.2d 618 (1975) (en banc). Since the possibility remains that the threat
constituting the coercion will not be carried out, one must take the risk and refuse to kill an
innocent third party. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 25, State v. Toscano, 75 N.J. 421, 378 A.2d 755
(1977).
37 Courts often treat the immediacy element as a threshold condition for establishing
the
duress defense. United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 408 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Stevison, 471 F.2d 143, 147 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950 (1973); People v.
Robinson, 411 111.
App. 3d 526, 529, 354 N.E.2d 117, 120 (1976).
38 A defendant claiming the defense of duress must prove that at the time he actually committed the crime he was in immediate danger of harm. See Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d
490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935); State v. Palmieri, 93 N.J.L. 195, 200, 107 A. 407, 409 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1919); Burton v. State, 51 Tex. Crim. 196, 201, 101 S.W. 226, 229 (1907). Commentators
have argued that within this immediacy requirement lies an inherent flaw, for
[t]o say that a threat of future harm is not sufficient is to ignore the fact that the
nature of a threat is to hold out a future harm. All danger to the "duressed" is in the
future, for if it were in the present it would no longer be a danger or a threat but
would be an accomplished harm.
Newman & Weitzer, supra note 24, at 328.
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mediacy element rests the policy consideration that one must take
40
advantage of any opportunity to escape 3 9 or seek police assistance.
The quantum of fear necessary to establish duress is at minimum
42
a fear of serious bodily harm. 41 Consequently, injury to property,
loss of employment,4 3 economic necessity, 44 and threat of prosecution 4 5 fail to meet the common law standard. In addition, courts reject the defense when premised upon a general apprehension of
danger unrelated to any specific threat. 4 6 There exists, however, no
47
requirement that the threatened harm be directed at the accused.
The courts often view threats or injury to another, especially a close
relative, as a sufficiently serious harm for this defense. 4 8 Fault or

39 United States v. Gordon, 526 F.2d 406, 408 (9th Cir. 1975); D'Aquino v. United States,
192 F.2d 338, 359 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 935 (1952); R.I. Rec. Center, Inc. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1949).
40 United States v. Stevison, 471 F.2d 143, 147 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950
(1973); Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (10th Cir. 1935); Bain v. State, 67 Miss.
557, 560, 7 So. 408, 409 (1890). Such a requirement may be potentially unfair especially where
police assistance would be ineffective. See Commonwealth v. Reffitt, 149 Ky. 300, 301, 148
S.W. 48, 49 (1912). See generally Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 680, 187 So. 392, 407 (1939).
" Pittman v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. 1974); State v. Crews, 17 N.C.
App. 141, 193 S.E.2d 317, 318 (1972). In the very early cases where a duress defense was
raised, fear of death was required. Respublica v. M'Carty, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 86, 87 (1781); United
States v. Haskell, 26 F. Cas. 207, 210 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 15,321). For a discussion of
quantum of force and resistance as an individual question, see Newman & Weitzer, supra note
24, at 329-30.
42 United States v. Palmer, 458 F.2d 663, 665 (9th Cir. 1972) ("grievous financial loss
[does] not constitute compulsion or duress which would excuse criminal conduct"). But see
Commonwealth v. Reffitt, 149 Ky. 300, 304, 148 S.W. 48, 49-50 (1912) (allowing for injury to
'reputation or property). One commentator has reasoned that "[o]nce the principle is admitted of
balancing the duress against the crime, it becomes obvious that a sufficiently serious threat to
property must excuse a sufficiently minor crime." G. WILLIAMS, supra note 22, § 181, at 597.
43 Moore v. State, 23 Ala. App. 432, 433, 127 So. 796, 796 (Crim. App. 1929); People v,
Ricker, 45 Ill. 2d 562, 568, 262 N.E.2d 456, 460 (1970).
44 State v. Gann, 244 N.W.2d 746, 752 (N.D. 1976) (defendant, charged with robbery,
claimed he needed money to provide food and shelter for family).
45 People v. Ricker, 45 Ill. 2d 562, 568, 262 N.E.2d 456, 460 (1970); State v. Patterson, 117
Or. 153, 156, 241 P. 977, 978 (1925).
46 Rhode Island Rec. Center v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.
1949);
People v. Robinson, 41 Ill. App.3d 526, 529, 354 N.E.2d 117, 120 (App. Ct. 1976); see State v.
Dissicini, 126 N.J. Super. 565, 569, 316 A.2d 12, 15 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 411, 331
A.2d 618 (1975) (en banc) (evidence indicated that defendant's fears not based on specific threat
but rather on fear that sign of disagreement would cause violent response from gang leader).
47 Koontz v. State, 204 So.2d 224, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (defendant's mother and
sister threatened).
48 The impulse of an individual to protect a close relative, especially a child "may be as
strong as, or stronger than, the desire to save [one's] own life." Hersey & Avins, supra note 31,
at 286; see G. WILLIAMS, supra note 22, at 598.
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negligence by the defendant, which contributes to the coercive situa49
tion, generally precludes the defense.
In addition to these substantive requirements, procedural variation exists as to the allocation of the burden of proof. In a number of
courts, the defendant need only introduce evidence of duress which
50
the prosecution must then disprove beyond a reasonable doubt.
This approach accords with the constitutional imposition on the state
of the burden of proof as to every element of the crime charged. 5 1
Other courts have designated duress as an affirmative defense requiring the accused to bear the burden of persuasion. 52 These courts
reason that they have only imposed a procedural burden whereby the
accused must prove reasons supporting his exoneration not his inno53
cence.
49 State v. Patterson, 117 Or. 153, 156, 241 P. 977, 978 (1925); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09
(2) (1962) (excludes duress as defense where accused's recklessness created situation). However,
where the accused was merely negligent, the defense is denied only if negligence suffices to
establish culpability as to the particular charge. State v. Patterson, 117 Or. at 156, 241 P. at 978.
The drafters of the Code drew a distinction "between inadvertence and the conscious risk creation involved in recklessness." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comments at 8 (Tent. Draft No.
10, 1960). Professor Stephen posited the situation where a member of a secret society commits
murder because he would have been assassinated if he refused. 2 J. STEPHEN, supra note 22, at
108.
50 See, e.g., United States v. Fleming, 7 C.M.A. 543, 556, 23 C.M.R. 7, 20 (1957); Moore
v. State, 237 Ga. 269, 270, 227 S.E.2d 241, 242 (1976); People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 621,
232 N.W.2d 184, 186 (1975); People v. Field, 28 Mich. App. 476, 478, 184 N.W.2d 551, 552
(1970); Stafford v. State, 104 Tex. Crim. 493, 495, 284 S.W. 581, 582 (Crim. App. 1926).
51 In re Winship, 397 US. 358, 364 (1970). This traditional approach can be traced to the
presumption of innocence which is utilized by courts of the United States, where a person is
presumed innocent until proven guilty. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452-61
(1895). Since this presumption attaches to all criminal defendants, the prosecution logically retains the burden of proving the defendant's guilt.
52 See, e.g., Pittman v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Ky. App. 1974); State v.
Milan, 108 Ohio App. 254, 261, 156 N.E.2d 840, 843 (1959); Comment, Constitutionality of
Criminal Affirmative Defenses: Duress and Coercion, 11 U.S.F. L. REV. 123, 138 (1976). This
approach strongly contrasts with that found in England, the source of the United States's substantive defense of duress. The English procedure imposes upon the prosecution the burden of
proving the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Regina v. Gill, [1963] 2 All
E.R. 688, 691 (Crim. App.); Regina v. Bone, [1968] 2 All E.R. 644, 645 (C.A.). Under English
law, the only criminal affirmative defense is insanity. Woolmington v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1935] A.C. 462, 475.
53 Some state courts have persistently relied on Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952),
where the Supreme Court sanctioned a state statute imposing the burden of proving insanity
upon the defendant. See In re Foss, 10 Cal.3d 910, 930-31, 519 P.2d 1073, 1086-87, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 649, 662-66 (1974); Commonwealth v. McKennion, 235 Pa. Super. Ct. 160, 166, 340 A.2d
889, 892 (1975). The Leland Court and its progeny have reached this result by distinguishing
between the express elements of a crime and affirmative defenses. 343 U.S. at 794. The attempt
to separate analytically elements of a crime from defenses stems largely from early judicial
characterization "of the criminal process as a dispute divisible into two kinds of issues: those
belonging to the prosecution's case and those belonging to the defendant's case." Fletcher, Two
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In 1970, the United States Supreme Court held in In re Winship 54 that the "Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." 55 In
1975, the Court, in Mullaney v. Wilbur,56 extended the Winship
standard to an affirmative defense. 5 7 The jury was instructed in Mullaney that absent proof by the defendant that he had acted in the
heat of passion, malice aforethought would be presumed if the state
proved an unlawful and intentional homicide. 58 The Supreme Court
denounced this procedure as violative of due process and held that
upon presentation of the issue in a homicide case the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of heat of pas59
sion.
The Mullaney analysis focused on "the interests of both the State
and the defendant as affected by the allocation of the burden of
proof." 60 These interests conflict when a defense is designated as
affirmative. The Court viewed the prosecution's interest as primarily
the hardship that might result from retention of the burden of proof
as to an issue. 61 Against this interest, the Court weighed the accused's interest in "his liberty" and "the certainty" of "stigmatiz[ation]" as a consequence of conviction, 62 "the societal interests in the

Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal
Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 899 (1968). This application of civil litigation principles to the criminal
process arguably fails to comport with due process. See generally Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684 (1975). But see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
54 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
55 397 U.S. at 364. The Winship trial court, with appellate court approval, had utilized the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in a juvenile delinquency adjudication. Id. at
359-60. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court answered affirmatively the question
"whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the 'essentials of due process and fair
treatment' required during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with an act which
would constitute a crime if committed by an adult." Id. at 359, 368.
56 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
57 Id.

at 698-704.

Id. at 686.
59 Id. at 704. The Court stressed that historically heat of passion had been the primary
"factor in determining the degree of culpability attaching to an unlawful homicide." Id. at 696.
By proving heat of passion, the defendant could rebut the malice aforethought element of the
murder charge. Id.
60 Id. at 699.
61 Id. at 701-02.
62 Id. at 700. The Mullaney Court, referring to the Winship decision, stated that the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard plays a vital role because the defendant in "a criminal
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance." Id. (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at
363).
58
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reliability of jury verdicts," 63 and the legal tradition that the prosecution must prove the accused guilty. 64 Unable to perceive any
"unique hardship" inuring to the state in carrying the burden of persuasion, the Court refused to sanction its placement upon the de65
fendant.
In the 1977 decision of Patterson v. New York, 66 the Supreme
Court reviewed the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring
the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
67
disturbance in order to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter.
Reasoning that this defense was a separate issue apart from the facts
69
of the crime, 68 the Court found no deprivation of due process.
This case was distinguished from Mullaney on the basis of its murder
statute. Unlike the Mullaney statute, the Patterson statute did not
include malice aforethought as an element of the crime. 70 Justice
Powell, the author of the Mullaney opinion, voiced a strong dissent
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. 7x The dissent accused the
majority of "drain[ing] In re Winship of much of its vitality" 72 and
73
labelled its adjudication "indefensibly formalistic."
In the last seventy-five years, the New Jersey judiciary has faced
duress claims in only four reported cases, none of which proved successful. 74 In each decision, the court alluded to the common law test

421 U.S. at 699. "It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned." Id.
at 700 (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 364); see 421 U.S. at 701.
0
4 Id. at 701.
rs Id. at 702. The Court discounted the possible difficulty for the prosecution attendant to
proving a negative and the fact that evidence of the defense may lie peculiarly within the
defendant's knowledge. Id.
66 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
67 Id. at 198-200.
68 Id. at 206-07.
69 Id. at 207. The Court deferred to the New York legislature's right to require the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances to reduce punishment. Id. at 207-09.
70 Id. at 210. In discussing the possibility that legislatures may shift burdens of proof by
designating certain elements of crimes as affirmative defenses, the Court stated that "there are
obviously constitutional limits beyond which the States may not go." Id. The actual extent of
such limitation is unclear at this time.
71 Id. at 216.
.63

72

Id.

73 Id. at 224.
74 See State v. Dissicini, 66 N.J. 411, 331 A.2d 618 (1975); State v. Falco, 60 N.J. 570, 292
A.2d 13 (1972); State v. Churchill, 105 N.J.L. 123, 143 A. 330 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); State v.
Palmieri, 93 N.J.L. 195, 107 A. 407 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
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of duress but never actually ruled as to the availability of the de75
fense.
In a 1919 case, State v. Palmieri,76 the first reported decision in
New Jersey to address the duress defense, the court of errors and
77
The
appeals found the defense inapplicable to the facts before it.
court noted that those jurisdictions which allow the defense uniformly
require that the duress be "present, imminent and impending." 78
Since the defendant participated in the murder "hours, if not days,
after the threat," the court determined that the danger lacked immediacy and that Palmieri had considerable opportunity to escape or
79
seek help.
The court of errors and appeals, in 1928, faced a duress claim,
this time in the context of a robbery prosecution. 8 0 In State v.
Churchill,81 the defendant, testifying. that he was unaware of the robbery plan, claimed to have driven the getaway car only because a gun
was placed at his back. 82 The court recited the common law duress
standard, stressing that the defendant had sufficient time to escape
and failed to take advantage of it. 8 3 However, the court expressly
refrained from "determining that duress is a legal defense to an indictment for crime" since that issue went beyond the facts pre84
sented.
Almost half a century later, a duress question again came before
New Jersey's highest court in State v. Falco.8 5 The defendant, a
police detective, appealed his conviction of misconduct in office for

15 See State v. Dissicini, 66 N.J. 411, 331 A.2d 618 (1975); State v. Falco, 60 N.J. 570, 292
A.2d 13 (1972); State v. Churchill, 105 N.J.L. 123, 143 A. 330 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928); State v.
Palmieri, 93 N.J.L. 195, 107 A. 407 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
76 93 N.J.L. 195, 107 A. 407 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
77 Id. at 199-200, 107 A. at 409. Palmieri conspired with several others in New York City to

rob a New Jersey farmer. Although their initial attempt was thwarted, they returned a few days
later to rob and murder their victims. Id. at 196, 107 A. at 408.
78 Id. at 200, 107 A. at 409. For a discussion of this common law immediacy requirement,
see notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
79 93 N.J.L. at 200, 107 A. at 409.
80 The evidence indicated that "a gang of armed bandits"....h[e]ld up' " a saloon while
Churchill waited out front in the getaway car. Id.

at 124, 143 A. at 330.

105 N.J.L. 123, 143 A. 330 (Ct. Err. & App. 1978).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 125-26, 143 A. at 331. The court believed that Churchill must have known of his
81

companions' plans before they entered the saloon and therefore he should have left immediately
instead of waiting twenty minutes for their return. Id. at 126, 143 A. at 331.
84 Id. at 125, 143 A. at 331.

85 60 N.J. 570, 292 A.2d 13 (1972).
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filing a false report, contending that he acted under duress. 86 Falco
feared losing his job if he did not file a report, therefore, he filed a
false report. 87 Emphasizing the absence of any threat of death or
physical injury, 8 8 the court found "no semblance of a defense that the
false report was the product of duress." 8 9 The court stated that no
compulsion existed to file the false report, but rather "[t]he compulsion was to tell the truth." 9 0
In a 1975 case, State v. Dissicini,9 1 the New fersey supreme
court rejected duress as a defense to murder where the defendant
had aided and abetted. 9 2 The court affirmed the appellate division's
interpretation of the common law rule prohibiting duress as a defense
to murder as embracing "all ...offenses where an intent to kill is an
essential element." 93 Dissicini's second degree murder conviction

86 Id. at 573-74, 586, 292 A.2d at 14, 21. The state contended that although Falco was
present in a tavern during a serious brawl, he filed a report denying it. Id. at 573-74, 292 A.2d
at 15.
87 State v- Falco, 114 N.J. Super. 53, 55, 274 A.2d 828, 829 (App. Div. 1971), rev'd, 60
N.J. 570, 292 A.2d 13 (1972). Falco's counsel objected at trial "to the introduction in evidence
of the report upon the ground that it had been wrung from [Falco] only by coercion." Id. The
trial court admitted it because "it was a report submitted in the regular course of duty." Id.
Relying on Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), the appellate division remanded for a
new trial. The appellate court interpreted Garrity as holding "that testimony elicited from a
public employee by a threat of discharge may not thereafter be used against him in a criminal
prosecution." 114 N.J. Super. at 56-57, 274 A.2d at 829. The supreme court reversed and
rejected any extension of Garrity to the facts at bar. 60 N.J. at 575-86, 292 A.2d at 15-21.
88 Since no threat by a third party was directed at Falco, the court reasonably assumed that
he "alone decided" on his course of action. Id. The court analogized to a person in private
employment. In that context, one could not defend against a criminal charge by contending his
employer directed him to commit the crime or face dismissal. It was held to be similarly erroneous to propose that one may file a false report to avoid dismissal for prior misconduct. Id.
at 586-87, 292 A.2d at 22.
89 Id. at 587, 292 A.2d at 22. The supreme court, unable to discern any connection between
the defense of duress and the crime of official misconduct for filing a false report, rejected
Falco's duress claim. Id. at 586, 292 A.2d at 21.
90 Id. at 586, 292 A.2d at 21.
91 66 N.J. 411, 331 A.2d 618 (1975). Justice Pashman, joined by Justice Clifford, wrote a
concurring opinion. However, Justice Pashman expressly based his decision on his firm belief
"that [the] defendant was not in fact coerced into participating in the brutal slaying." 66 N.J. at
412, 331 A.2d at 618. Since the evidence did not support Dissicini's claim of duress "under any
formulation of the defense," Justice Pashman thought it inappropriate to "reach the issue of
whether the defense is available in this State either in the criminal context generally, or specifically as a defense to a charge of murder." Id. at 412, 331 A.2d at 619.
92 Id. at 412, 331 A.2d at 618. The defendant took part in an assassination planned by his
motorcycle gang. He contended that he acted under duress because he knew the leader would
kill him if he did not obey instructions. Additionally, Dissicini attempted to justify his failure to
take advantage of the numerous opportunities to escape and seek police help by insisting that
he feared the leader would find him. 126 N.J. Super. at 569, 316 A.2d at 15.
93 126 N.J. Super. at 571, 316 A.2d at 16.
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indicated a jury finding of an intentional killing and the court deter94
mined that the defense had been properly disallowed.
The defense of duress has been defined statutorily in twentyeight states, including New Jersey.9 5 The statutes reflect the legislatures' attempts to ameliorate the restrictive nature of the traditional
common law test of duress. They generally address four major issues:
the crimes to which duress affords a potential defense; the severity of
the threat required; the immediacy of the threatened danger; and the
nature of the threat, i.e., reasonable belief of threat as opposed to
96
actual threat.
Many states which have codified the duress defense, define it as
a defense to any crime. 97 Six states, however, exclude duress as a
defense to any capital crime, 9 8 while eight expressly prohibit it in
homicide cases. 99 Other states have permitted duress to serve as a
mitigating factor in murder prosecutions. 10 0
Id.
95 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-412 (West 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-208 (1975); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 26(8) (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-708 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-14 (West 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 431 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-906
(1972); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-231 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-201 (Cum. Supp. 1978); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-11 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-8 (Burns Cum. Supp.
1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.090 (Baldwin 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(b) (West

1974); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A,

§ 54 (1978);

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.08 (West 1964); MONT.

§

REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3-110 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 2C:2-9 (West eff. Sept. 1, 1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW

194.010(9) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 40.00

(McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT.

CODE § 12.1-05-10 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 152, 155, 156 (West 1958); OR. REV.
STAT. § 161.270 (1977); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 309 (Purdon 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 22-5-1 (Supp. 1977); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 8.05 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-302 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.060 (West 1977); WiS. STAT. ANN.

§ 939.46 (West 1958).
96 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comments at 2 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).

97 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-208 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-14 (West 1972); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 431 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-231 (1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00

(McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-10 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 152,
155, 156 (West 1958); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 309 (Purdon 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 22-5-1 (Supp. 1977); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 8.05 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-2-302 (1977). These states employ the same approach as the MODEL PENAL CODE.

The following states allow duress to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter: Minnesota: MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.08 (West 1964); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West eff. Sept. 1,
1979); Wisconsin: Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.46 (West 1958).
98 CAL. PENAL CODE

CODE

§ 18-210

§

26(8) (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT.

§

18-1-708 (1974); IDAHO

(Cum. Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-11 (Smith-Hurd 1972); MONT.

REV. CODES ANN.

§ 94-3-110

(1977); NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010(9) (1973).

9 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-412 (1977) (homicide or serious physical injury); GA. CODE
ANN.

§ 26-906

(1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-8 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978): Ky. REV. STAT.

§ 501.090 (Baldwin 1975) (intentional homicide); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 54 (1978); OR. REV. STAT.

§ 161.270

§

14:18(6) (West 1974);

(1977); WASH. REV. CODE

ANN. § 9A. 16.060 (West 1977) (murder or manslaughter).
100 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609-08 (West 1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West eff. Sept. 1,

1979); WiS. STAT. ANN.

§ 939.46

(West 1958).
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The state codes vary as to the severity of the threat necessary to
substantiate the defense. Although some jurisdictions require fear of
death, 1 0 ' most allow the duress defense upon an evidentiary showing
of a threat or use of force.' 02 A frequently proposed standard permits the defense where the threats would intimidate a person of ordinary or reasonable firmness. 10 3
Another area commonly treated by legislation deals with the immediacy of the threatened danger. Approximately half of the statutes
expressly require that the threat of injury be instant or imminent.
Threats remote in time are generally insufficient.10 4 However, a
growing number of states have completely eliminated the immediacy
requirement from their definition of duress. 10

101

5

CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(8) (West 1970); IDAHO CODE § 18-201 (Cum. Supp. 1978); MINN.

STAT. ANN. § 609.08 (West 1964).
102 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-412 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN.

§ 41-208 (1975); COLO. REV.

STAT. § 18-1-708 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 53a-14 (West 1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 431 (1975); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-906 (1972); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-231 (1976); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-11 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-8 (Burns Cum. Supp.

1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 501.090 (Baldwin 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(6) (West 1974);
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 54 (1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3-110 (1977); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 194.010(9) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West eff. Sept. 1, 1979); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 40.00 (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-10 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, §§ 152, 155, 156 (West 1958); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.270 (1977); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 309 (Purdon 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-5-1 (Supp. 1977); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. tit. 2, § 8.05 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.16.060 (West 1977); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46 (West 1958).
103 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-208 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-14 (West 1972); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 702-231 (1976); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-8 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1978); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West eff. Sept. 1, 1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00 (McKinney 1975);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-10 (1976); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 309 (Purdon 1973); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 8.05 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302 (1977).
104 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-412 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-14 (West 1972);
GA. CODE ANN. § 26-906 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-11 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-41-3-8 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(6) (West 1974); ME.
REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 54 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.08 (West 1964); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 94-3-110 (1977); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00 (McKinney 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-05-10 (1976) (felonies only); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 8.05 (Vernon 1974) (felonies
only); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.060 (West 1977);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.46 (West 1958).
1o

ARK. STAT. ANN.

§ 41-208 (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(8) (West 1970); COLO. REV.

STAT. § 18-1-708 (1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 431 (1975); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-231
(1976); IDAHO CODE § 18-201 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 501.090 (Baldwin 1975);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010(9) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West eff. Sept. 1, 1979);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 152, 155, 156 (West 1958); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.270 (1977); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 309 (Purdon 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-5-1 (Supp. 1977).
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Legislatures also concern themselves with whether a reasonable
belief that a threat exists suffices for a duress defense. Generally,
they agree that the accused may avail himself of the defense if
reasonable cause supports his belief. 10 6 Nevertheless, one state re10 7
quires "actual compulsion" before the defense will lie.
Attempting to modify the rigid constraints of the common law
standard of duress, the Model Penal Code and the New Jersey Code
of Criminal Justice provide that where an individual faces coercion by
force or threats of force, "which a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist," a duress defense maintains. 1 0 8 Both codes promulgate a standard with "which normal
109 They
members of the community will be able to comply ......
recommend focusing on the tangible factors comprising the particular
106

ARiz.

REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 13-412 (1977);

ARK. STAT. ANN.

§ 41-208 (1975);

CAL. PENAL

CODE § 26(8) (West 1970); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-906 (1972); IDAHO CODE § 18-201 (Cum. Supp.
1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-11 (Smith-Hurd 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:18(b)
(West 1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3-010 (9) (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 194.010 (9)
(1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.46 (West 1958).
107 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 152, 155, 156 (West 1958).
108 The MODEL PENAL CODE provides in pertinent part:
Section 2.09. Duress.
(1) It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to
constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to
use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of
reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
(2) The defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor recklessly
placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to
duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such
a situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense
charged.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962). The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice is nearly identical. It states in part:
Section 2C:2-9. Duress.
a. Subject to subsection b. of this section, it is an affirmative defense that the
actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was
coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person
or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation
would have been unable to resist.
b. The defense provided by this section is unavailable if the actor recklessly
placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to
duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was criminally negligent in placing
himself in such a situation, whenever criminal negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. In a prosecution for murder, the defense is only
available to reduce the degree of the crime to manslaughter.
New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West eff. Sept. 1, 1979).
109 Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 414 & n.31
(1958). This approach contrasts sharply with the common law duress standard which required
heroic resistance. See Newman & Weitzer, supra note 24, at 326. The modern definition of
duress stems from an understanding
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defendant's situation, such as age, strength, size and health.110
Temperament, however, remains an improper element for consideration."' Under the Model Penal Code and the New Jersey Code of
Criminal Justice, the identity of the persort threatened, the nature
and imminency of the threat, and the seriousness of the crime
charged carry evidential weight. 11 2 The codes differ significantly in
their treatment of the use of duress in homicide cases. The Model
Penal Code permits duress as a complete defense to murder," 3 while
the New Jersey code would only allow it to mitigate the charge to
manslaughter. 11 4 Although labelled an affirmative defense by both
penal codes, 11 5 each emphatically rejects placement of the burden of
persuasion on the defendant."1 6 Both codes require that tile defend-

that law is ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed that it is hypocritical, if it imposes on the actor who has the misfortune to confront a dilemmatic choice, a standard that his judges are not prepared to affirm that they should and could comply
with if their turn to face the problem should arise. Condemnation in such case is
bound to be an ineffective threat; what is, however, more significant is that it is
divorced from any moral base and is unjust. Where it would be both "personally
and socially debilitating" to accept the actor's cowardice as a defense, it would be
equally debilitating to demand that heroism be the standard of legality.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comments at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
"0 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comments at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); NEW JERSEY
PENAL CODE § 2C:2-9, Commentary at 71 (1971).
"' MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comments at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); NEW JERSEY

PENAL CODE § 2C:2-9, Commentary at 71 (1971). The exclusion of.individual temperament
from consideration emanates from the policy decision that to allow such consideration "would be
no less impractical or otherwise impolitic than to permit [liability] to depend upon such other
variables as intelligence or clarity of judgment, suggestibility or moral insight." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.09, Comments at 6 (Tent Draft No. 10, 1960).
112 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comments at 7-8 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); NEW JERSEY

PENAL CODE § 2C:2-9, Commentary at 71 (1971). This position represents a radical departure
from the strict requirements of the common law defense. The drafters of the MODEL PENAL
CODE suggested that the traditional factors of the common law standard, see notes 22-38 supra
and accompanying text, be accorded evidential weight along "with the actor's conduct in succumbing to the pressure they exert, since men of reasonable firmness surely break at different
points depending on the stakes that are involved." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09, Comments at 8
(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
"3

MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962). The underlying assumption is that under certain

circumstances homicide may result from "coercion that is truly irresistible." Id., Comments at 8
(Tent Draft No. 10, 1960).
114 New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (b) (West eff. Sept. 1,
1979). The New Jersey drafters determined that "[t]he value of human life ... justifie[d] this
higher standard" and followed the Wisconsin lead. NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE § 2C:2-9, Commentary at 71 (1971).
15 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1962); New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT.

ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West eff. Sept. 1, 1979). For a discussion of the characterization of a defense as
"affirmative," see note 17 supra.
116 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE

§ 2C:1-12, Commentary at 35-36 (1971). The drafters of the MODEL PENAL CODE explained
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ant only carry the burden of introducing evidence of duress.1 17 After
this initial burden is met, the prosecutor bears the burden of persuasion to negate the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.""
Toscano reflects judicial cognizance of the strong "potential for
injustice" inherent in the common law definition of duress. 119 The
court rectified this possibility by promulgating a new standard based
on the abilities of a person of reasonable firmness. 120 The promulgation of this new duress standard constituted a partial adoption of the
approach of the proposed New Jersey Penal Code subsequently
enacted as the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, 12 1 since the
122
court ignored the Code's allocation of the burden of persuasion.
The Toscano court viewed the defendant's "failure to allege a
present, imminent and impending' danger of harm" as "the sole defect" in his defense. 12 3 The supreme court, in examining the propriety of this element of the duress defense,' 24 traced the common law
requirement of immediate danger to the early treason cases, "to the
proclivities of a 'tougher-minded age' . . . or simply to judicial fears of
perjury and fabrication of baseless defenses." ' 2 5 However, the court
noted that a per se rule grounded on immediate injury may result in
the exclusion of valid claims of duress.' 2 6 Therefore, Justice
Pashman reasoned that the immediacy of the threatened danger
should be an issue properly left with the jury rather than a prerequi12 7
site to a duress instruction.
that the position of the Code is not to shift the burden of proof "except in very special circumstances," which are not presented in the context of a duress defense. MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.09, Comments at 9 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). See generally NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE

§ 2C:1-12, Commentary at 35-36 (1971).
117 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955);
. 2C:1-12, Commentary at 35-36 (1971).
18 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(2) (Tent. Draft No. 4,

NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE

1955); NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE

§ 2C:1-12, Commentary at 35-36 (1971).
Q
119 74 N.J. at 436, 378 A.2d at 762. The narrow common law definition effectively eliminates
availability of the duress defense to many criminal defendants.
120 Id. at 442, 378 A.2d at 765.
121 Id. at 442, 378 A.2d at 764-65. Since Toscano pre-dated the enactment of the New Jersey
Code of Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:1-1 to :98-4 (West eff. Sept. 1,1979), the court
followed the proposed NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE § 2C:2-9 (1971).
122 74 N.J. at 442-44, 378 A.2d at 765-66.
123 Id. at 430, 378 A.2d at 759. For a discussion of the common law requirement of "present,
imminent and impending danger," see notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
124 74 N.J. at 436-40, 378 A.2d at 761-64.
125 Id. at 436, 378 A.2d at 762.
126 Id. at 440, 378 A.2d at 764. The court expressed that in certain cases "resistance to
threats or resort to official protection [may] not [be] realistic." Id.
127 Id. Prior to Toscano, when the New Jersey judiciary was presented with a duress defense, it summarily dismissed'the claim if it failed to meet the immediacy requirement. See
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Toscano replaced the common law standard of heroism 128 with a
guideline it determined to be realistically attainable by the average
person. 129 If a person of reasonable firmness in the defendant's situation would have been unable to resist the threats made, then the
defendant may potentially offer duress as a defense.' 3 0 In addition,
Toscano eliminated the traditional preliminary determination by the
trial court of whether the accused was threatened with "present, imminent and impending" danger. 131 Instead, the immediacy element
along with such factors as the crime committed, the type of threat
and opportunities for escape or resistance should be accorded eviden32
tial weight in assessing the propriety of a duress defense.'
Under Toscano, duress provides a potential defense to any crime
except murder. 133 The court, reaffirming the Dissicini 134 and Palmieri 135 holdings prohibiting the defense in homicide prosecutions,
deemed it inappropriate to extend or modify their prior position on
136
this issue within the facts of Toscano.
The supreme court declared that under both the Model Penal
Code and the proposed New Jersey Penal Code, Doctor Toscano's
claim of duress was properly a jury question.' 3 7 The court found it
State v. Palmieri, 93 N.J.L. 195, 107 A. 407 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919); State v. Churchill, 105
N.J.L. 123, 143 A. 330 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928).
128 See Newman & Weitzer, supra note 24, at 326.
129 See 74 N.J. at 439, 378 A.2d at 764.
130 Id. at 442, 378 A.2d at 765. Some commentators have espoused a subjective standard
which would allow for consideration of the defendant's personal attributes. Newman & Weitzer,
supra note 24, at 329-31. For an interesting analysis of the reasonable man standard as opposed
to the subjective standard, see Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1269, 1289-93 (1974). Fletcher suggests that the "only .. . sound way to determine the traits attributed to the reasonable man ... is with an eye to the justice of blaming
the accused for having displayed weakness of character." Id. at 1292. With this as his basic
premise, Fletcher recommends a jury instruction which would "refer to a standard of a reasonable man with the specific pathological fears of the defendant." Id.
13174 N.J. at 442, 378 A.2hat 765. This particular aspect of the new standard will probably
ensure the revitalization of the duress defense.
132Id. at 439, 442, 378 A.2d at 764, 765. The court followed the suggestion of the drafters of
the MODEL PENAL CODE. For a further discussion of the factors to be considered in establishing the defense, see note 108 supra and accompanying text.
13374 N.J. at 442, 378 A.2d at 765.
"' 126 N.J. Super. 565, 571, 316 A.2d 12, 16 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 N.J. 411, 331 A.2d
618 (1975); see notes 91-94 supra and accompanying text.
13593 N.J.L. 195, 107 A. 407 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919); see notes 76-79 supra and accompanying text.
136 74 N.J. at 440-41 n.12, 378 A.2d at 764-65 n.12 .This position differs from the New Jersey
Code of Criminal Justice's provision that duress can at least serve to mitigate a murder conviction to one of manslaughter. New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9(b)
(West eff. Sept. 1, 1979). For the rationale employed by the Code's drafters, see note 114
supra.
137 74 N.J. at 440, 378 A.2d at 764.
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feasible that a jury might infer that the threats to the doctor and his
wife created a fear of danger 138 to which a person of reasonable firmness would have succumbed. 13 9
Although the Toscano court "deliberately followed the language
of the proposed New Jersey Penal Code," 140 it sub silentio rejected
the Code's allocation of the burden of persuasion to the state with
respect to disproving the duress defense. 14 ' Instead, Justice
Pashman stated that in order to obtain an acquittal, the defendant
must carry the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence as to this defense.1 4 2 The prosecutor would retain the burden
of proving all other elements of the crime and disproving any other
defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.14 3 The potential "for abuse and
uneven treatment" latent in the new duress standard influenced this
decision.' 4 4 Consequently, the court concluded that the same approach applicable to insanity cases would be "appropriate as a matter
14 5
of public policy" when a duress defense is raised.
Judge Conford concurred with the majority's reversal of Doctor
Toscano's conviction but dissented from the court's holding that the
defendant must bear the burden of persuasion on the duress issue. 146 The dissent viewed the court's imposition of the burden of
persuasion as "an unwarranted modification of the civilized concept of
the Anglo-American criminal law that it is the burden of the State to
prove the guilt of the.criminally accused beyond a reasonable doubt
in every case."147
138 Id. at 441, 378 A.2d at 765.
139 Id. at 441-42, 378 A.2d at 765.
140 id. at 442, 378 A.2d at 765. The court also announced that it "expect[ed] trial judges [to

follow the Toscano lead] in fram[ing] their jury charges." id.
141 See notes 99-102 supra and accompanying text.

142 74 N.J. at 442, 378 A.2d at 765. In other words, the court characterized duress as a true
affirmative defense-not only must the criminal defendant introduce evidence of the defense
but he must also bear the burden of persuasion as to the issue. Id.
143 Id. at 443, 378 A.2d at 765-66.

144 Id. The court directed the reader's attention to Note, Justification: The Impact of the
Model Penal Code on Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914, 917 & n.9 (1975). 74 N.J. at
443, 378 A.2d at 765-66. The primary concern of the court appeared to be the fabrication of
baseless claims emanating from the "open-ended nature of [the new duress] standard." Id.
145 74 N.J. at 443, 378 A.2d at 766. The court's imposition on the defendant of the burden of
persuasion as to duress contrasts with the general rule that the defendant need only introduce
evidence of the defense. See, e.g., State v. Talbot, 71 N.J. 160, 165, 364 A.2d 9, 11 (1976)
(entrapment); State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, 72, 174 A.2d 881, 888 (1961) (self-defense).
146 74 N.J. at 444, 378 A.2d at 766.

147 Id. In State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J. Super. 479, 174 A.2d 506 (App. Div. 1961), Judge
Conford reasoned that
[ilf a defendant is as a matter of law relieved of criminality where his defense is

well-founded, then imposing upon him the burden of persuasion of the jury as to
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Toscano departed from the general rule previously followed by
New Jersey and advocated by the Model Penal Code that the defendant must bear only the initial burden of production of evidence of
his defense, leaving the burden of disproving it beyond a reasonable
doubt with the prosecution. 14 8 The dissent, unconvinced by the
reasoning of the majority, argued that duress is subject to no greater
likelihood of abuse than any other affirmative defense. 14 9 Further,
Judge Conford discounted the fact that evidence of duress lies almost
exclusively within the accused's knowledge.' 5 0 "If the defense of
duress is true in a particular case," the dissent noted, "the defendant
is innocent as having been free from culpable intent."151 As a rule,
a defendant cannot be convicted absent a finding beyond a reasonable
doubt of criminal intent. 152 However, as Judge Conford indicated,
under the Toscano holding, a conviction may result even though the
jury entertains a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted free of
duress. 153
While in the past, New Jersey's judiciary "tacitly approved" the
common law standard of duress, 154 the sparse record illustrates how
the stringent requirements of the common law defense effectively destroyed its viability. 15 5 Toscano's adoption of a new duress standard
evinces a rational step forward as to a criminal defendant's ability to

the merits of the defense is necessarily destructive of the universally conceded
proposition that on the whole case the State must prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Obviously the "whole case" includes the defense.
Id. at 501, 174 A.2d at 518-19.
148 74 N.J. at 444, 378 A.2d 767; see MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1), (2) (1962); The New
Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-12(a), (b) (West eff. Sept. 1, 1979);
State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 432-33, 197 A.2d 185, 190-91 (1964); State v. Chiarello, 69 N.J.
Super. 479, 498, 174 A.2d 506, 517 (App. Div. 1961) (opinion by Judge Conford). See also C.
McCoRMICK, supra note 17, § 341, at 802.
149 74 N.J. at 445, 378 A.2d at 767.
150 Id. at 445-46, 378 A.2d at 767. This particular circumstance seems inherent in the

nature of defenses and "explains why the standard rule imposes on the defendant the initial
burden of coming forward with some evidence of the defense (unless the State's case supplies
it)." Id. at 446, 378 A.2d at 767.
1s1 Id. at 445, 378 A.2d at 767; see note 153 infra and accompanying text.
152 74 N.J. at 445, 378 A.2d at 767.
153 Id. In Toscano, the defendant was charged with conspiracy to obtain money by false
pretenses. Id. at 423, 378 A.2d at 756. Intent was held to be an element of conspiracy in State
v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 186, 244 A.2d 499, 502, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952 (1968). Duress
arguably negates criminal intent. See People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 622, 232 N.W.2d 184,
187 (1975).
h5 74 N.J. at 430, 378 A.2d at 759. In this manner, the Toscano court characterized the state
of the law as to duress prior to its decision announcing a new standard. Id.
155See notes 24 & 74 supra and accompanying text.

1978]

NOTES

575

raise the duress defense. The new standard portends to be both flexible and realistic by considering the particular situation of the accused
faced with duress and eliminating the requirement of imminent
danger.
After Toscano, the court's traditional threshold determination as
to whether the defendant was subjected to "present, imminent and
impending" danger will no longer be necessary or allowed. 156 This
aspect of Toscano will probably have the most significant ramifications
since in the past duress defenses were often defeated at this
juncture. 157 Duress, as defined in Toscano, is available as a defense
to any crime except murder.1 58 In this respect, the court maintained
a conservative stance and chose not to follow the position of either
the Model Penal Code, which allows duress as a defense to murder,
nor the proposed New Jersey Penal Code which permits duress to
reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. 15 9 Toscano eliminated the
traditional requirement of a threat of death or serious bodily harm to
the defendant in order to claim duress.16 0 Instead, the gravity of the
harm threatened is only one factor in the jury's consideration of
whether the defendant acted as a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation. The Toscano court also intimated that courts will look to
the quantum of force used or threatened in relation to the severity of
the crime charged as a significant factor. This approach would allow
duress as a potential defense to a minor crime where the defendant
was subjected to a similar degree of force.161
It appears that the Toscano court deemed it necessary to qualify
the liberal dimensions of the new duress standard by imposition of the
burden of persuasion on whomever asserts the defense. 162 The court
justified its allocation of the burden of proof solely on policy

16 See 74 N.J. at 442, 378 A.2d at 765. Defendants will no longer be required to show
heroic resistance and threats of future harm may be sufficient. See Newman & Weitzer, supra
note 24, at 326-29.

1'7See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text.
15874 N.J. at 442, 378 A.2d at 765.
"' For the probable reasons underlying this position, see notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text. For the Codes' rationales, see notes 113-14 supra and accompanying text.
16074 N.J. at 442, 378 A.2d at 765.
161Id. at 436-37 n.10, 378 A.2d at 762-63; see C. WILLIAMS, supra note 22, § 181, at 597.
For a discussion of the merits of balancing the coercion experienced against the severity of the
crime, see Newman & Weitzer, supra note 24, at 329-30.
162 74 N.J. at 442-44, 378 A.2d at 765-66. One writer suggested that this approach emanates
from "a desire to provide a more even balance of procedural burdens between defendant and
the prosecution." Comment, Affirmative Defenses Under New York's New Penal Law, 19 SYRACUSE L. REv. 44, 46 (1968).
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grounds.1 63 The primary concern of the majority centered on the
prevention of illegitimate claims of duress. 164 By adhering to the
procedure utilized in insanity cases, which requires the accused to
prove his defense, the court felt that it had properly balanced the
relaxed duress standard it had announced.' 65 "Public policy,"166
however, does not justify such an allocation of the burden of persuasion in a criminal prosecution where the defendant "has at stake interests of immense importance." 167
The propriety of the Toscano imposition of the burden of persuasion is questionable under the mandate of Winship, 168 as amplified in
Mullaney, 1 69 that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
163 74 N.J. at 443, 378 A.2d at 766. In the context of a civil case, such reasoning would
barely cause a raised eyebrow since no societal interest is served by favoring one party over
another. Access to the evidence becomes the primary factor in the court's allocation of the
burden of proof. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.8, at 255-59 (1965). In the criminal case, on

the other hand, there exists the defendant's right to due process and society's interest in a fair
criminal justice system which serves to minimize erroneous convictions. See notes 62-65 supra
and accompanying text. It has long been recognized "that where the burden of proof lies may
be decisive of the outcome." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958). Such a significant
procedural device should not be assigned based on mere policy alone. "The interest of the
government is in proving that guilty persons are guilty .. . not simply in winning cases."
Ashford & Risinger, supra note 17, at 186.
164 74 N.J. at 443, 378 A.2d at 766. Judicial fears of baseless claims, however, are not sufficient to undermine the due process protections accorded to criminal defendants. See generally
Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86
YALE L.J. 1299, 1336-38 (1977).
16574 N.J. at 443, 378 F.2d at 733. The court failed to provide an explanation of why it
determined that duress was more analogous to insanity than to self-defense of which it is a
variation. In the latter defense, the defendant need only introduce evidence of the defense. See
State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, 72-73, 174 A.2d 881, 886 (1961).
166 74 N.J. at 443, 378 A.2d at 766.
167 In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363. The United States Supreme Court explicitly stated in
Mullaney that under the due process clause "exacting standards" are necessary before a defendant may be required "to bear th[e] ultimate burden of persuasion." Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421
U.S. at 703 n.31. Clearly, public policy does not comport with this rule. In Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), the Supreme Court determined that the defendant's superior access
to information did not justify the statutory presumption. Id. at 469. The Court recognized that
criminal defendants always have, at the very least, an equal familiarity with the facts as the
prosecution. Id. "It might, therefore, be argued that to place upon all defendants in criminal
cases the burden of going forward with the evidence would be proper. But the argument proves
too much." Id.
Requiring the accused to bear the burden of proving duress may effectively force him to
testify, particularly where he alone has information probative of the defense. The ramifications
of this allocation of the burden of persuasion are especially oppressive where the defendant has
a prior record and faces the difficult decision of either taking the stand to defend or remaining
silent. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 432-33 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting).
168 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In Winship, the Court enunciated the constitutional basis of the
reasonable doubt standard. Id. at 364; see notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
169 Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975). For a detailed analysis of Mullaney, see notes
56-65 supra and accompanying text.
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doubt "the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged." 170 The Supreme Court, however, in Patterson,171 modified its earlier holdings by drawing a distinction between statutorily
defined elements of a crime and defenses to a crime. Although the
Patterson Court reaffirmed that it is constitutionally impermissible to
require a defendant to disprove an element of a crime, it approved
placement of the same burden on the defendant when the defense
constitutes "an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance." 172
The effect of Patterson on Toscano hinges on the determination
of whether proof of duress, as a negation of intent, constitutes disproof of an element of the crime of conspiracy or whether it merely
demonstrates "an exculpatory or mitigating circumstance." 173 Such a
determination was not made by the Toscano court which based its
decision on the public policy of balancing the "open-ended nature of
[the new duress] standard." 174 The constitutional implications of the
court's decision to impose the burden of persuasion on the defendant
were not acknowledged.
If the Toscano court had applied Patterson to its holding, it
probably would have characterized duress as a "gratuitious defense", 175 i.e., a separate issue from proof of guilt. However, since
duress indicates the absence of intent, 1 76 which has been held to be
an element of the crime of conspiracy, 1 77 imposition of the burden of
persuasion on the defendant regarding duress was inappropriate. The
better approach would have been to require the defendant .claiming
duress to introduce evidence of it and then require the state to disprove it. 178

170 397 U.S. at 364.
171 432 U.S. 197 (1977); see notes 66-73 supra and accompanying text.
172 432 U.S. at 207.
173 Id.

174 74 N.J. at 443, 378 A.2d at 766.

175Underwood, supra note 164, at 1312-13.
176 Moore v. State, 137 Ga. App. 735, 736, 224 S.E.2d 856, 857 (Ct. App.), rev'd on other
grounds, 237 Ga. 269, 270, 227 S.E.2d 241, 242 (1976); People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 622,
232 N.W.2d 184, 187 (1975).
177See State v. Moretti, 52 N.J. 182, 186, 244 A.2d 499, 502, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952
(1968).
'78 In 1976, Maryland's highest court took the position that shifting the burden of persuasion
to the defendant when an affirmative defense was raised contravened fundamental due process
principles. State v. Evans, 278 Md. 197, 207, 362 A.2d 629, 635 (1976). The appellate court
stated that "[t]here can be no doubt as- to the applicability of the Mullaney v. Wilbur principle
to the so-called 'affirmative defenses' generally." 28 Md. App. 640, 713, 349 A.2d 300, 345 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1975), affd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). The Mullaney mandate should apply
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The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice 179 codifies this approach so that as of its effective date the undesirable aspect of Toscano will be eliminated. It is unclear whether the court will follow
Toscano's imposition of the burden of persuasion on the defendant or
attempt to align courtroom procedure with the new Code during the
interim period. After the Code's effective date, however, criminal defendants may utilize'the progressive duress standard announced in
Toscano by introducing evidence of the defense which must be disproved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt. This 6ombination of
judicial and legislative efforts creates a rational and accessible defense
for criminal defendants.
Monica E. Olszewski

to affirmative defenses generally because the primary considerations are the same. The label
attached to an issue is not determinative particularly in light of the ease with which a state can
redefine the elements of a crime. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 222 (1977) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 698. The defendant's interest in punishment
and stigmatization remains whether the issue is denominated a defense or an element and "no
unique hardship" on the state results from requiring it to bear the burden of persuasion as to
non-duress. See 421 U.S. at 702.
Commentators have expressed that "an intimate relationship [exists] between the operation
of a Morgan presumption and the creation of an affirmative defense." Ashford & Aisinger, supra
note 17, at 170. A Morgan presumption places both the burden of introducing evidence and the
burden of persuasion on the opponent of the presumption. 1 E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 33-35 (1954). Thus, there is a general presumption that the defendant did not act
under duress. To defend on the basis of duress, under Toscano, the defendant must not only
introduce evidence of duress, but ultimately prove he acted because of it to obtain an acquittal.
In effect, Morgan presumptions (affirmative defenses) redefine the crime by requiring the defendant to disprove an element (non-duress) assumed present by the presumption. See Ashford
& Risinger, supra note 17, at 169.
By interpreting Mullaney to include all affirmative defenses, a Thayer presumption would
be employed instead of the Morgan approach. The defendant would only have to introduce
evidence of the defense, eliminating the presumption of its absence, and the burden of persuasion would shift to the prosecution. See J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT
THE COMMON LAW (1898).
179 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-9 (West eff. Sept. 1, 1979).

